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The authors challenge the assumption that organizations are willing to use all the volunteer 
labor available to them. Rather, they are influenced by the costs incurred of utilizing 
volunteer labor. This article provides a modest first look at the demand for volunteers by 
nonprofit institutions. Specifically, the article presents an economic analysis of the 
demand of volunteer labor by hospitals in the Toronto area and examines some of the factors 
that may determine the hospitals’ willingness to use volunteer labor. Using data generated 
from 28 hospitals in Toronto, which use a total of more than 2 million volunteer hr 
per year, the authors show that the quantity of volunteer hours demanded is a decreasing 
function of their costs. Other factors such as productivity, output, and labor market 
institutions also influence the demand for volunteers. 
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An important avenue of resource allocation in the Canadian economy is private 
philanthropy. In 2000, gifts of money and time amounting to $4.9 billion 
and 1.1 billion hours, respectively, were given in private donations to 
nonprofits in Canada. This is a significant share of resources transferred voluntarily 
by Canadians. Twenty-seven percent of all adult Canadians volunteer, 
and the economic value of their time donations is valued at more than $14 
billion, which represents 1.4% of Canada’s GDPand far exceeds the monetary 
donations (Hall, McKeown, & Roberts, 2001; Statistics Canada, 2004b). 
More than 161,000 nonprofit and voluntary organizations in Canada 
employ volunteers in the production of a variety of goods and services. Nine 
out of 10 volunteers (93%) are engaged in the production of services in these 
organizations (Statistics Canada, 2004a). In a national survey of volunteers, 
more than half (57%) of all volunteers reported that they helped to organize or 
supervise activities, 41% served on working committees and governing 
boards, 40% were involved in canvassing or fund-raising, 30% provided consulting 
or administrative work, and somewhat less than 30% were involved in 
educating, lobbying, coaching, providing care, delivering food, driving, performing 
maintenance, and so forth on behalf of an organization (Hall et al., 
2001). 
Although there are many studies that examine individual decisions to supply 
volunteer labor, there is a paucity of literature on organizational demand 
for such labor. This research addresses this gap in the literature and seeks to 
delineate factors that influence an organization’s demand for volunteer labor. 
We study a particular set of organizations—hospitals—that have a long tradition 
of using both paid and volunteer labor. Specifically, we examine hospitals 
in Toronto, which are increasingly relying on volunteer labor to enhance 
the quality of health care provided. Traditionally, hospital volunteers consisted 
of hospital auxiliaries that were mainly composed of society ladies and 
spouses of physicians and who ran gift shops and helped with fund-raising. 
More recently, however, hospitals have been recruiting large numbers of volunteers 
from all walks of life for these and many other types of services.1 
These trends in the use of volunteers by hospitals have required hospitals to 
move from ad hoc management of volunteers to engaging professional managers 
to train, screen, and manage volunteers. Although this 
professionalization of volunteer management was, in part, a response to the 
growing number of volunteers, it was also a response to the increasing vulnerability 
of hospitals to liability issues. In turn, this professionalization has 
increased the costs (per volunteer) that hospitals face in using volunteer 
labor.2 
 Using data generated from interviews with the CEOs of 28 hospitals in the 
Toronto area and data on their volunteer programs, we examine some factors 
that may influence the demand for volunteers within hospitals. We proceed as 
follows: The next section discusses the literature on volunteer labor. This is followed 
by a section that considers factors that may determine the extent of the 
employment of volunteer labor in hospitals. In this part, we also consider how 
CEOs’ attitudes toward their volunteers may be viewed as proxies for some of 
the factors that affect demand for volunteer labor. The subsequent section 
presents our research methodology and is followed by a report of the findings 
of our research. In the final section, we analyze our results and offer 
concluding remarks. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF VOLUNTEER LABOR 
 
When constructing the supply function of unpaid labor, economists deviate 
from the traditional models used for paid labor, which are often modeled 
as a function of wages, nonwage income, and available hours. Because volunteer 
labor receives a zero wage, it must be viewed differently (Freeman, 1997). 
There exist several models of the supply of volunteer labor, each with some 
predictive value. First is a consumption model in which volunteering is a 
utility-yielding activity—the individual receives satisfaction from the very act 
of volunteering. This individual maximizes utility subject to a time and budget 
constraint (Andreoni, 1990; Menchik&Weisbrod, 1987; Prouteau&Wolff, 
2004; Segal & Weisbrod, 2002). Second is an investment model in which volunteering 
is undertaken by an individual to enhance future income potential. 
Here, the individual invests volunteer hours out of available leisure hours to 
maximize future earnings (Katz & Rosenberg, 2004; Menchik & Weisbrod, 
1987). Other models include viewing the output of volunteers as a public 
good, where the volunteer receives satisfaction from the output produced by 
his or her volunteering efforts (Schiff, 1990; Unger, 1991). 
In addition to theoretical work, there is a large empirical literature on the 
supply of volunteer labor. Much of this literature has focused on identifying 
socioeconomic and personal characteristics that are likely to predict volunteering 
among the general population using the above models (Carlin, 2001; 
Freeman, 1997; Menchik & Weisbrod, 1987; Proteau & Wolff, 2004; Smith, 
1994; Vaillancourt, 1994; Vaillancourt & Payette, 1986; Van Dijk & Boin, 1993; 
Wolff, Weisbrod, & Bird, 1993). Large empirical surveys profile typical volunteers, 
examine the motives for volunteering, specify where volunteers tend to 
work, and focus on the characterization of volunteers based on their socioeconomic 
demographics (Davis Smith, 1998; Hall et al., 2001; Hodgkinson & 
Weitzman, 1992; Independent Sector, 2001). 
 
In all cases of modeling the volunteer labor supply, the implicit assumption 
is that organizations are willing to use all the volunteer labor that is offered 
(quantity and quality) for each type of volunteer job they establish. In other 
words, the assumption is made that demand for (volunteer) labor is infinite 
when the wage rate of labor is zero.3 However, although volunteers do not 
impose direct wage costs, there are other costs that they do impose. The equating 
of a zero wage rate with zero costs is not, in general, a realistic assumption, 
and it ignores the reality that faces organizations that use volunteer labor 
(Steinberg, 1990). 
An organization’s nonwage costs of employing volunteers in terms of day to- 
day operating costs such as recruitment, screening, training, managing, 
and providing office space, materials, and so on are significant. Indeed, such 
costs are particularly important within the context of hospitals, where screening 
and training are essential (Handy & Srinivasan, 2004). In our interviews 
with hospital CEOs, we found that volunteers are subject to careful screening, 
orientation, training, and often work side by side with paid health professionals. 
Although hospitals minimize risks (and their liability) by carefully prescribing 
what volunteers may or may not do, issues of privacy, contact with 
minors, and other sensitive issues generally require that volunteers be 
carefully screened and well trained. 
Hospitals in the Toronto area are involved in a continuous recruiting of volunteers. 
However, they do not accept all volunteers who apply. In some hospitals, 
waiting lists exist for certain volunteer jobs, whereas in a few there are 
shortages, especially of skilled volunteers. Many reported that they cannot 
expand their volunteer base due to the lack of resources to manage the increasing 
number of volunteers. Individuals looking for specific volunteer positions, 
specific hours, or those who could not make a commitment for a specified 
minimum number of hours find it difficult and sometimes impossible to 
obtain volunteering work (Karom Group of Companies, 2001; LaPerriere, 
1998). As one CEO told us, “We will have to rethink our policy in accepting 
short-term volunteers; the turnover is very costly.” Thus, organizations 
clearly view volunteers as imposing a cost on them despite the fact that the 
wage rate of volunteers is zero. 
Emanuele (1996) found that nonprofit organizations in the United States 
seem to be choosing the amount of volunteer labor they use in accordance 
with an implicit downward sloping demand curve for volunteer labor that is 
consistent over time.Due to data limitations, she was not able to uncover specifications 
for the demand curve for labor. Emanuele’s findings lend credence 
to the fact that organizations using volunteer labor do not accept all volunteer 
labor that is supplied and associate costs with its use. 
 
DEMAND FOR VOLUNTEER LABOR IN HOSPITALS 
 
To fully understand the amount of volunteer labor being utilized, it is necessary 
to understand the supply and demand curves for volunteer labor. 
Equations of volunteer labor supply are based on utility-maximizing individuals’ 
decisions on how to allocate their time. The individual’s decision to provide 
hours of volunteer labor includes the opportunity costs facing the individual, 
the after-tax price of charitable contributions (considered as a 
substitute for volunteering for the individual), wealth, and attitudes to volunteering. 
The latter are usually proxied by socioeconomic characteristics such 
as age, gender, education, and religiosity. 
Due to differing expectations and objectives as well as histories, geography, 
and culture, different organizations attract and utilize different types of volunteer 
labor. For example, the ownership of the organization, or the subsector 
of the economy in which the organization is located, can lead to a sorting out of 
volunteer labor (Segal & Weisbrod, 2002). To minimize these differences, we 
focus on volunteer labor in a relatively homogeneous sector, namely, publicly 
subsidized nonprofit hospitals in the Toronto area, which face similar political 
and cultural environments. 
In an era of increasing demand for health care and a dwindling of public 
support, publicly subsidized nonprofit hospitals in Toronto have increasingly 
turned to private donations of money and time to augment their resources. 
Such donations fund capital expenditures and new services as well as maintain 
existing services. Some hospitals rely on significant amounts of volunteer 
labor to produce many of their services. 
In principle, it is necessary to know the organization’s objective function in 
order to determine the derived demand for volunteer labor. The demand 
curve for volunteer labor should be derived from the objective function of the 
organization, utilizing volunteer labor as one of the inputs in production. 
Organizations are faced with a choice of how much to produce and also how 
much to use of each of the various inputs of production. In other words, the 
demand function for one input, that is, hours of volunteer labor, will depend 
on its productivity, its price, and other available substitutes. Several 
non economic factors will also influence the decisions of organizations to use 
volunteer labor. 
However, as is well recognized, the objective function of a nonprofit is not 
well understood (Steinberg, 1990). It is, of course, possible to focus on a “sub objective 
function” as done by Schiff (1990), who assumed that this function is 
the net value of volunteers. However, such objective functions are simplistic. 
For example, assume that hospitals wish to maximize the amount of health 
care they provide.4 To do this they need funding. Hence, a sub objective function 
may be to maximize revenue (including donations of time). However, 
that does not imply maximizing the net value of volunteers. First, volunteering 
may crowd out other donations by the private sector, by substitutions of 
time for money donations. Moreover, volunteering and money donations may 
crowd out government support (Handy & Webb, 2003). Conceptually, various 
sub objective functions could theoretically be collapsed into a single measure 
such as the monetary equivalent of the present value of patient welfare, but it 
is difficult in practice. In summary, it is almost impossible to define a 
hospital’s objective function, or even its sub objective function. 
Despite this, for most reasonable objective functions, it is possible to derive 
testable predictions of the demand for volunteer labor by assuming that the 
hospital pursues its goals in an efficient manner. For example, the choice of 
using an additional hour of labor as an input should be made if and only if the 
value of the additional output (marginal rate of productivity [MRP]) fromthis 
hour is equal to the price paid for this hour. For overall efficiency, this should 
be true for all inputs of production, and at equilibrium these input ratios of 
MRP to price should be equal for all inputs.5 For example, hospitals will 
eschew volunteer labor as its price increases (the costs per hour of volunteer 
labor incurred by the organization) and turn to substitute inputs with lower 
input ratios (of MRP to price) such as minimum wage labor. Thus, we expect 
the utilization of volunteer labor to be positively influenced by its productivity 
and negatively influenced by its costs. 
A hospital will also be mindful of the environmental constraints under 
which it operates, such as the existence of labor contracts and its obligations to 
the community as reflected in its mission statements. Thus, the factors influencing 
the demand for volunteer labor likely include the cost and productivity 
of volunteer labor, the total output generated, and non economic factors such 
as organization culture and organizational constraints. 
We now examine each of these factors and then suggest ways of measuring 
them. 
 
Costs Per Hour of Volunteer Labor 
As explained above, efficiency requires that labor as an input is hired until 
the value added by the last hour is offset by the cost of that hour. Hence, even 
if, for institutional reasons, this equality is not strictly maintained, it is clear 
that the amount of labor used is dependent on the level of wages: The demand 
function for labor shows a negative relationship between the wage levels and 
the amount of labor demanded. In the case of volunteers, although the explicit 
wages are zero, zero wages does not imply that there are zero costs to the 
employer. As discussed earlier, volunteers impose costs of recruiting, screening, 
training, managing, and recognition. 
These costs are likely to be substantial. A reasonable proxy for such costs in 
a hospital is the volunteer administration budget, which includes the salaries 
and office costs of managers whose task is to coordinate and manage volunteer 
resources in the hospital. We argue that such costs per volunteer hour 
affect the organization’s decision regarding the amount of volunteer labor to 
use. When these costs increase, hospitals are likely to use less volunteer labor: 
We hypothesize a negative influence of costs per volunteer hour on the number 
of volunteer hours used by the hospital. 
Scale-Output 
As output increases, the organization’s demand for inputs will increase; 
thus, the number of volunteer hours an organization uses will have a direct 
relationship to its output. We use the size of the hospital as captured by the 
number of beds as a proxy for output. This is a reasonable measure of the output 
of a hospital because the number of patients in the hospital at any one time 
is a good proxy for the output produced by the hospital. Also, given that all the 
hospitals in our sample receive their revenue from the same insurance source, 
that is, the Government of Ontario, the number-of-beds measure may be a 
reasonable proxy for relative output. 
Trade-Off for Time Donations 
Money donations allow the CEO to purchase other inputs for health care 
production, whereas time donations can only be used to produce services provided 
by volunteers. Thus, we focus on the trade-off CEOs are willing to make 
between time donations and money donations, to indicate what they perceive 
to be the relative advantage of using volunteer labor in the production of 
health care. This acts as a proxy for the MRP ratios. 
Assume a CEO can choose a monetary donation instead of 1 hr of volunteer 
time, everything else being equal. We use a hypothetical question to elicit the 
minimum money donation that the CEO would be willing to forgo for 1 hr of 
volunteering. This is an indicator of the CEO’s dollar valuations of an hour of 
volunteer time as an input in production. To put it differently, the value put on 
an hour of volunteer time is the hospital’s opportunity cost of giving up that 
hour. 
If, for example, a volunteer hour can be replaced by paid labor at the cost of 
$12.50, then any trade-off value above $12.50 suggests that the CEO intrinsically 
values the work of a volunteer in excess of what paid labor (a substitute) 
can produce in terms of the hospital’s direct output. Higher valuation of the 
volunteer hours would suggest that volunteer labor produces benefits to the 
hospital beyond its labor. These may include the goodwill generated by their 
presence, their service as ambassadors to the general public, enhancement of 
community relations, and so on. For example, if the CEO places the trade-off 
value at $50.00, she or he is signaling that the value of the production of 1 hr of 
volunteer labor is 4 times greater than the value of the output produced by 4 hr 
of a substitute input, that is, an hour of paid labor (at $12.50). Thus, we hypothesize 
that hospitals where CEOs provide higher trade-off values on volunteering 
hours will have greater utilization of volunteer labor than the hospitals 
where CEOs provide lower values. 
Productivity and CEO Satisfaction 
In the case of volunteer labor whose input is often in the softer services, 
such as making patients and their families comfortable and other nonmedical 
jobs, there is no single quantitative measure of productivity. Although some 
outputs of volunteer labor such as running gift shops, providing information, 
answering telephones, and assisting with clerical tasks may be measured 
using market wages,6 it is difficult to measure this without detailed data on the 
number of volunteer hours assigned to each task. Furthermore, such measures 
would assume that in the absence of volunteer labor, paid labor would be 
hired to replace volunteer labor; however, it is not clear that in the absence of 
volunteer labor all of the services would be offered, thus making replacement 
value at market wages inappropriate as productivity measures. 
How, then, should the productivity of volunteer labor be evaluated? We 
suspect that in practice, the value of such labor is judged subjectively. If so, it 
may be proxied by how the CEO of the hospital perceives volunteers as fulfilling 
the mission of the hospital. We therefore suggest that the utilization of volunteer 
labor will be influenced by its productivity as perceived by the CEO.7 
Because use of volunteer labor requires the hospital to expend real resources, 
the ultimate decision on allocation of resources rests with the CEO. The CEO’s 
evaluation of the output produced by volunteers will therefore affect the 
hospital’s demand for volunteer labor. 
 
Demand for Volunteer Services and Mission Statements 
Volunteer labor cannot be used in direct medical interventions. They can, 
however, be used to produce many soft services that focus on the comfort and 
emotional well-being of the patients and on reducing patient and family anxiety 
(Handy & Srinivasan, 2004). The extent to which a particular hospital values 
soft services can be gleaned by examining the hospital’s mission or vision 
statements. These statements almost invariably make mention of the quality 
of nonmedical care, that is, care that can be produced by volunteers. The following 
hospital mission statement is illustrative: “We believe that compassion, 
caring and technical excellences are equally important.”8 In view of this, 
Govekar and Govekar (2002) suggest that to ascertain the demand for volunteer 
labor, it is necessary to examine the institution’s mission statement to see 
if the statement reflects the kinds of services that volunteer labor produces. 
Such a public declaration in the mission statement of the kind of services produced 
by the hospital—services that are generally provided by volunteers— 
signals that volunteer labor is an essential input in the production of the services 
provided. Thus, we posit that mission statements of hospitals that 
explicitly mention that the care provided by the hospital includes the services 
generally provided by volunteers, or explicitly mention volunteers in the 
delivery of health care, are likely to reflect a high demand for volunteer labor. 
 
Organizational Constraints: Labor Contracts 
Often, paid workers view volunteers negatively because volunteersmaybe 
viewed as replacement for paid labor. In cases where labor contracts exist to 
prevent volunteer labor substituting for paid labor, any perceived substitution 
between paid and unpaid work can lead to friction in unionized environments 
and is subject to grievance (Macduff, 1997; Zahnd, 1997). In these cases, 
a hospitalmaybe constrained fromusing the desired levels of volunteer labor9 
both directly, as a result of numerical constraints on the number of volunteers 
producing a given service, and indirectly in order to achieve industrial peace. 
Furthermore, due to hospital regulations (to minimize their liabilities) volunteers 
cannot provide any service that is of a medical nature or done by medical 
professional staff. Although some of the hospitals in our sample did not 
have labor contracts, the contracts of those that did had an explicit clause stating 
that volunteers may not perform work done by paid staff except in those 
areas that were run by volunteers before 1986 (Canadian Union of Public 
Employees [CUPE], 2000).10 We therefore hypothesize that hospitals with collective 
labor contracts will use less volunteer labor that those not subject to 
such constraints. 
 
To sum up the above discussion, Table 1 identifies the factors influencing 
demand and provides the expected direction of the relationship between the 
dependent variable—hours of volunteer labor utilized by the hospital—and 
the six independent variables. 
In later sections, we examine the data to determine whether the six factors 
mentioned above explain the use of volunteer labor by hospitals. Before doing 
so, we describe in the next section the methodology used in obtaining the data. 
 
METHOD 
Data for this study were obtained from28 hospitals in the greater metropolitan 
area of Toronto, Canada. The geographically restricted sample was dictated 
by cost considerations. Although this area contains 57 hospitals, we limited 
our sample to the 31 hospital sites that use at least 100 volunteers, have at 
least one paid staff responsible for volunteer administration, and have data 
available on their volunteer programs. For this research, the sample of CEOs 
we wish to survey is 29; this number reflects the case of multiple hospital sites 
being run by a single CEO: Because we conducted only one interview with the 
CEO in charge, we ended up with a sample size of 29. Due to its protocol, one 
hospital was unable to allow us to access required data and was therefore not 
included in the data set. Our sample was therefore reduced to 28. 
We sent a letter inviting the hospital CEOs to participate in this study. We 
then telephoned to schedule a meeting. Face-to-face interviews with CEOs 
lasted 30 to 45 min. Unfortunately, the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome, 
a highly infectious virus) outbreak in 2003 led to the closing down of 
all major hospitals in the Toronto area for a considerable period of time during 
this study. Promised interviews were cancelled and could be rescheduled only 
after the SARS threat had subsided. These interviews were conducted either in 
person or by phone and lasted between 35 and 40 min. 
In a few cases when the CEO was not available, generally due to the SARS 
epidemic, we interviewed an individual designated by the CEO. Although 
designates’ titles varied from chief financial officer to vice president of human 
resources, these individuals usually worked closely with their CEOs, were 
involved in key decision making, and were often responsible for overseeing 
volunteer resources in an administrative role. Hence, they were perfectly suitable 
proxies for the CEOs. We refer to all our interviewees as CEOs. 
We used a structured questionnaire, with several open-ended questions. 
The questions covered a variety of topics ranging from overall satisfaction 
with the volunteer program to the trade-off of donations of time for monetary 
donations, to detailed and specific questions on how CEOs made budget decisions 
for their hospitals’ volunteer programs. In many of the interviews, the 
open-ended questions generated detailed responses and thereby provided a 
richer understanding of the informational basis for decision making. All interviewees 
were assured of confidentiality; the quantitative findings that follow 




The hospitals in our sample had an average of 545 beds each. Nearly two 
thirds of the hospitals described themselves as acute and general hospitals; 
the rest categorized themselves as providing long-term rehabilitation or psychiatric 
care. Due to recent mergers, some hospitals in our sample operated at 
more than one location, sometimes with separate volunteer programs and distinct 
sets of volunteers. An average of 700 individuals volunteered at each site, 
with an average contribution of more than 71,000 hr per hospital per year in 
2002. 
Our findings are organized as follows: In subsection A, we examine how 
CEOs obtain information on the volunteer programs. We assume that such 
information will eventually affect the allocation of resources for volunteer 
programs and their perception of the contribution of their volunteers. Second, 
in subsection B we carry out a content analysis of mission statements. In subsection 
C, we estimate the effect of various factors on the extent to which 
 
Table 1. Factors Influencing Demand for Hospital Volunteers 
 
 





hospitals use volunteer labor. This is based on a simple regression, where the 
dependent variable is the number of volunteer hours utilized by the hospital. 
 
A. THE VIEW FROM THE TOP: CEO PERCEPTIONS OF VOLUNTEER DEMAND 
AND SUPPLY 
Because CEOs have the final word on resource allocation, we were interested 
in assessing how CEOs receive information on their volunteer resources 
and thereby make decisions about volunteer labor. In particular, we wished to 
measure how informed the CEOs were about the contribution made by service 
volunteers in their hospitals—independent of any occasional interaction 
with volunteers. We asked the CEOs what reports they received on the activities 
and the performance of their volunteers and who provided them with 
these reports. 
The reports varied by hospital and ranged from reports made by directors 
of volunteer programs reporting on hours provided by volunteers to more 
general information gathered through requests for budgets and reports of 
fund-raising or honoring volunteers. We grouped our results into (a) quantitative 
reports, such as volunteer hours donated and/or the number of volunteers 
and programs, and (b) qualitative reports, which included receiving 
information at events, description of volunteer services, training or recruitment 
sessions, and dealing with problems or issues arising. 
Two of the CEOs received only quantitative reports, and three received 
only qualitative reports. The other 23 CEOs received both qualitative and 
quantitative reports. In addition, all CEOs received informal feedback, such as 
comments from staff, patients, and families and unsolicited letters. This suggests 
that the majority of CEOs had good reporting mechanisms in place. 
Without exception, all CEOs believed that their volunteer programs are 
cost-effective. It was their view that indirect and direct costs such as those 
incurred in recruiting, training, and managing volunteers are easily outweighed 
by the benefits delivered by the volunteers. One comment stating 
that “four hundred volunteers managed by a staff of three is a good management 
ratio” was indicative of the general tenor of the comments made by the 
CEOs. 
It was not evident that any of the CEOs had performed any explicit cost benefit 
analysis of the use of volunteers, though they may have had discussions 
with volunteer managers regarding their budgets. In fact, the CEOs 
tended to view these budgets as measures of the costs of having a volunteer 
program. Nevertheless, CEOs generally saw volunteers as providing more 
than labor at a low cost. They also viewed volunteers as playing a public relations 
role and as highly important links to their communities. 
Previous research has indicated that many of the hospitals in the Toronto 
area would like to increase their volunteer base but find it difficult to do so due 
to the lack of resources available to manage new volunteers (Handy & 
 Srinivasan, 2004). In view of this, we asked the CEOs of the hospitals what 
constraints they face in expanding their volunteer base. 
The majority (slightly more than 50%) indicated the lack of resources to be 
able to deal with larger number of volunteers. These included resources to 
recruit, supervise, and train volunteers as well as physical resources such as 
office space and other facilities. A little less than a third of the CEOs indicated 
that the demand for certain positions could not be met by the available volunteers 
and that as a result, they were not able to expand volunteer services. Only 
a few of them stated that the supply of volunteers was limited, indicating that 
this was one of the major reasons for their inability to expand. Others, especially 
those in teaching hospitals (which might be viewed by volunteers as 
being more prestigious), had an excess of volunteers. Other constraints indicated 
by the CEOs included potential labor issues with existing union contracts 
and retaining a staff-to-volunteer ratio balance. 
More than 85% of the CEOs recognized that over the years there have been 
significant changes in the nature of volunteers and volunteering. The demographics 
are changing (such as more students, more males, and a greater cultural 
diversity), and the turnover rate is increasing. We asked the CEOs to 
share the major challenges that the hospital faces regarding their volunteer 
programs. Nearly three quarters suggested that their hospitals face a lack of 
resources and structure to support their volunteer programs adequately. Two 
thirds suggested that recruitment of volunteers to fill certain types of positions 
is becoming difficult, as volunteers are either unable or unwilling to take on 
specified tasks. This is exacerbated by the competition from other institutions 
for volunteers. Short-term volunteers were seen as a drain on resources (in 
terms of recruitment and training), and one hospital CEO suggested that the 
acceptance of such volunteers should be reconsidered. 
Consider how satisfied CEOs are with their volunteer resources. High satisfaction 
will, ceteris paribus, imply that CEOs will want to expand their volunteer 
base. We asked CEOs to rate their satisfaction with the volunteer contribution 
on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = lowest satisfaction, 10=highest satisfaction) The 
responses averaged 8.7, with a standard deviation of 1.3; this level of CEO satisfaction 
suggests that CEOs are receiving good reports from the surveys they 
conduct and the informal feedback they receive from patients and families, as 
well as their own observations. 
 
B. DEMAND FOR VOLUNTEER LABOR 
 
We examined each hospital’s mission or vision statement or statement of 
goals, available on its Web site, to see whether it included in the provision of 
health care the kinds of services generally produced with volunteer labor 
input. All 28 hospital mission statements referred to having a goal to provide 
excellence in health care that they saw as comprising more than services provided 
by medical professionals. They all emphasized the holistic nature of 
health care by stressing the need to ensure that health care included compassionate 
care, spiritual well-being, and so forth. In different ways, they stressed 
that health care was not simply provided by doctors and nurses but was a 
function of a whole “team” of workers. Some explicitly mentioned volunteers 
in the provision of health care services, while others alluded to the team but 
did not specify the team members. That all 28 mission statements directly or 
indirectly related quality of care with including services provided by volunteers 
did not enable us to discriminate between the hospital using the mission 
statement as an explanatory variable directly. 
More detailed content analysis of the mission statements showed fewer 
than half (12 of 28) of the hospitals we studied mentioned volunteers or volunteer 
programs explicitly in their mission statements. A few made it a point to 
recognize the contribution of volunteers and pledged to make it an integral 
part of their health care provision. However, most hospitals (25 of 28) mentioned 
volunteers and the need for volunteers in achieving their mission in 
other printed and electronic literatures. Due to the enormous variability in 
how volunteers were mentioned, the nature of mission statements, and published 
and electronic literatures available from the various institutions, it was, 
therefore, not possible to construct a meaningful quantitative index for this 
measure to include in our statistical analysis. 
We also asked CEOs how much of a money donation they were willing to 
trade off for an hour of volunteer time. This was not an easy question for CEOs 
to ponder because it is a question “outside the box.” To help respondents, we 
asked whether they were willing to accept $5.00 or an hour of volunteer time. 
We raised the dollar amount in increments of 5 until the CEO chose a monetary 
donation over 1 hr of volunteer time. 
Several CEOs still found this question difficult and either declined to 
answer or gave very high values (exceeding $1,000) that we omitted in our calculations 
as “protest” answers. Most of the other values ranged from $15 to 
$50, with an average of $25.90. This somewhat overestimates the value of volunteer 
time, which has been estimated to have an average replacement value 
of $17.57 for hospitals (Handy& Srinivasan, 2004). As CEOs could have easily 
substituted volunteer labor (with paid labor or other inputs) using the money 
donation received, the amount indicated by the CEO is a reasonable proxy for 
how the CEOs valued the productivity of volunteer labor as an input into the 
production of health care in their hospital. 
 
C. DETERMINANTS OF DEMAND FOR VOLUNTEERS 
 
From the findings above and our discussion on the determinants of volunteer 
demand, we model the demand for volunteer hours to be a function of 
five independent variables: 
1. cost/hour: costs per volunteer hour (total costs divided by the number of 
volunteer hours); 
2. trade-off value: the productivity of 1 hr of volunteer labor for the trade-off 
dollar figure for 1 hr of volunteer labor, as indicated by the CEO; 
3. CEO satisfaction: CEO satisfaction (on a scale of 1-10, 1 = not satisfied with 
volunteers and 10 = highly satisfied with volunteers); 
4. beds: number of beds at the hospital; and 
5. union: the existence of a labor union (a dummy variable with 0 and 1, 
where 1 indicates the existence of a labor contract that constrains volunteer 
hours and 0 indicates no labor contract or one that does constrain 
volunteer labor). 
As mentioned above, we used only five of the six variables suggested in Table 
1; we omitted mission statements because all 28 mission statements spoke 
of providing services that are generally done by volunteers. In addition, as a 
result of the difficulty in quantifying the appearance of “volunteers” in the 
mission statements due to the extreme heterogeneity in the types and nature 
of these statements, we could not include it in our analysis. 
Our data of 28 observations represent 15,284 hospital beds, the combined 
size of the hospitals that use an aggregate of 2,003,292 volunteer hours per 
year, that is, an average of more than 71,000 hr per year per hospital. Using the 
data collected on Variables 1-5 above, we ran a linear regression to estimate the 
effects of these variables on the demand for volunteer hours. The linear regression 
produces an R2 of 0.73. The coefficients are all statistically significant at p 
less than .05 levels with the exception of CEO satisfaction, as seen in Table 2. 
In the linear regression analysis, we find that four of the five determinants 
of demand for volunteers are significant, and that three of these are significant 
in the expected direction.11 It is important to note, however, that although we 
describe our regression as a demand function, our analysis must be viewed as 
preliminary because what is actually observed is the equilibrium result of the 
interplay of demand and supply. In other words, there exists what is known in 
econometrics as an identification problem. Nonetheless, we feel that our interpretation 
of the regression as a demand function is reasonable because such a 
large proportion of the hospitals felt that there was no shortage of potential 
volunteers. 
The first determinant of the demand for volunteer labor that we analyze is 
the cost per volunteer hour that is incurred by the hospital. This includes all 
the various costs of recruiting, screening, training, managing, and retaining. 
As expected, we find that the cost of volunteer labor has a negative effect on 
the quantity of volunteers demanded. And because the marginal cost per volunteer 
hour is small, this highly significant negative relationship between volunteer 
hours and the cost per volunteer hour suggests that the demand for 
volunteer labor is very sensitive to costs: The demand curve for volunteer 
labor is the traditional downward sloping curve. 
As expected, we find a direct and significant relationship between the volunteer 
hours utilized and the trade-off value given by the CEO for an hour of 
volunteer labor.12 This suggests that there is greater demand for volunteer 
labor in those hospitals where the CEO views volunteer labor as more 
productive. 
With respect to CEO satisfaction, we found a positive effect, as expected, 
but this was not statistically significant. This may, perhaps, be explained by 
the small amount of variability that is observed in this variable. 
As expected, we find that the scale effect on the number of volunteer hours 
used, that is, the number of beds in a hospital, has a positive and significant 
effect on the hospital’s demand for volunteer hours. 
The existence of a constraining labor contract significantly influenced the 
use of volunteer hours, but in the opposite direction than expected. We find 
that the existence of labor contracts does not reduce the demand for volunteer 
hours. This result suggests that it may be necessary to look more closely at the 
relations between management and labor and not simply at the existence of a 
labor contract. The nature of the relationship will depend on the way labor 
contracts can impinge on the use of volunteer labor. It is possible that if there is 
a clear demarcation on what volunteer labor can and cannot do with respect to 
paid labor, then the existence of the labor contractmay not impinge negatively 
on the demand for volunteer hours within this delineated work domain. 
Rather than deter the use of volunteer labor, labor contracts, which remove 
uncertainty, may be conducive to its use. It is also likely that hospitals with 
labor contracts work harder to utilize volunteer labor, as they pay higher 
wages to unionized labor.13 
The significant positive correlation may also suggest that hospitals that 
have made peace with existing labor unions regarding volunteer labor and 
their presence can increase volunteer labor without being afraid of creating 
tensions within hospitals. And those hospitals without labor contracts may be 
more careful in increasing their demand for volunteer labor with the fear of 
creating problems among their paid staff and creation of unions. Given that 
the majority of the hospitals in our sample have labor contracts in place, there 
exists a culture of labor contracts in which the hospitals, employed workers, 
and volunteers have learned to coexist. 
 
 





VOLHOURS = volunteer hours. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Many scholars have decried the paucity of research on the demand side for 
volunteer labor. This article takes a first, albeit modest, step in this direction by 
way of an empirical examination of the determinants of the demand for volunteer 
labor. The approach taken uses the economics literature on the demand 
for labor and the conventional wisdom regarding volunteers. In addition, the 
existing literature on the supply of volunteer labor is used to derive insights 
on how to proceed with the demand side of the picture. 
The study offers a rudimentary demand function for volunteer labor from 
an organizational perspective. It uses the perspective of CEOs in 28 nonprofit 
hospitals in the Toronto area, data on costs of volunteer hours, and organizational 
constraints to derive demand for volunteer labor. Recognizing the near 
impossibility of specifying an objective function or a production function for a 
nonprofit hospital, the model nonetheless identifies some of the key factors 
that are likely to influence the demand for volunteer labor. Because CEOs 
make resource allocation decisions within hospitals, we assume that the 
CEO’s perspectives would influence the demand for volunteer hours based 
on his or her perception of the value and productivity of volunteer labor. 
After isolating several factors likely to influence the use of volunteer labor 
in a hospital environment, we focused on five independent variables and ran a 
linear regression of these variables on volunteer hours. This regression 
explains 73% of the variation for the demand for volunteer hours. Our findings 
provide some support to the expected direction of the effects of costs, output, 
and productivity on the use of volunteer hours. Our findings indicate that 
the use of volunteer labor by hospitals is negatively related to the costs per volunteer 
hour and positively related to measures of productivity and output. We 
also found confirmation for the notion that organizational constraints matter. 
It is also interesting to note that the relationship between the presence of a 
union and the use of volunteer labor was significant, but not in the expected 
direction. Whereas our original view was that the presence of a labor union 
deters the use of volunteers, the opposite appears to be true. Further work on 
this issue is needed, in which information on the nature of the working relationship 
between hospital management and the labor union is explicitly 
examined. 
Due to the limitations of the size of our sample, further research on a larger 
number of homogeneous organizations and in different sub sectors is 
required. The elusive problem of specifying objective functions for organizations 
must be confronted to help specify a theoretically based demand function 
for volunteer labor. In the case of hospitals, patients (consumers) cannot 
choose the services of volunteers without consuming other services provided 
by paid staff. These services are bundled with other services, and we had to 
make simplifying assumptions on output measures. Future research could be 
based on organizations with less complex objective functions. 
In summary, the results appear to point to the existence of a downward 
sloping demand curve for volunteer labor: The demand for volunteer labor is 
not infinite. This has theoretical as well as practical policy implications. Policies 
that promote volunteering and thereby increase the supply of volunteers 
do not necessarily help nonprofits lower their costs (by using larger available 
amounts of volunteer labor). Indeed, to the extent that the use of volunteers is 
demand rather than supply constrained, policies should focus on facilitating 
the incorporation of volunteer labor rather than increasing its supply. 
Make-work projects designed to absorb the available supply of volunteer 
labor will distort the goals and efficiency of organizations. Funding arrangements 
for organizations using a large number of volunteers should be targeted 
to help organizations use professional management techniques. This 
will help to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and reduce liabilities that may be 
attendant with the use of volunteer labor. In addition, effective management 
will help organizations use available volunteer labor in meaningful ways that 
will provide benefits not only to organizations utilizing them but also to 
volunteers. 
Finally, as mentioned above, although our article focuses on the demand 
side of volunteer labor and delineates the determinants, the supply of volunteers 
and its interaction with demand remain important issues for research. 
Notes 
1. Auxiliaries have been disbanded in many hospitals or merged with volunteer departments. 
In some instances where they coexist with volunteer departments tensions exist between 
the auxiliaries and volunteer departments (Atkinson, 1997; Handy & Srinivasan, 2004). 
2. It seems very likely that beyond a certain number of volunteers, the cost associated with 
volunteers is convex. 
3. The assumption is that the demand for volunteer labor exceeds the supply of volunteer 
labor at a wage rate of zero. 
4. It is difficult, if not impossible, to distill even this seemingly simple objective function into 
an operative measure. How does one measure health care? How is health care aggregated across 
individuals? Which group of individuals enters a specific hospital’s objective function? 
5. MRPi / pi = 1 for all inputs i of production in the long run. 
6. Of course, measuring productivity is complex, even in well-defined work such as, for 
example, a volunteer receptionist: the number of people greeted, the diameter of the smile produced 
by the volunteer, and the amount of eye contact all enter into productivity. 
7. A comprehensive measure of productivity should also include the perceptions of patients 
and their families. However, due to the ethical protocols in hospitals, eliciting such information 
from patients and their families is not permissible. 
8. Retrieved June 17, 2003, from Lake Ridge Health Corporation, www.lakeridgehealth. 
on.ca/get/vision.htm. 
9. Many other types of organizations have restrictions on the use of volunteers for work done 
by paid staff; for example, labor contracts by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) 
with school boards specify the limitations of the use of parent volunteers in schools and annually 
review the use of volunteers (retrieved June 13, 2004, from http://www.sd61.bc.ca/hr/pdf/ 
volunteer. PDF). 
10. Section 11.02 of the Central Hospital Agreement—a result of a grievance filed by CUPE 
(CUPE, 2000; Handy, Mound, & Vaccaro, 2004). 
11. Furthermore, a bi variate correlation shows no significant correlation among the five independent 
variables. Multicollinearty was not an issue. 
12.Afew CEOs were unable to answer this question; we used the mean as a substitute for these 
missing values in our regression. 
13. We thank one of our anonymous referees for suggesting this point. 
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